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Abstract
Existing knowledge has been shown to interact with episodic information in a variety of
memory tasks. The present study examined a known bias due to existing knowledge in the
context of memory for facial features. Specifically, we examined if the category bias, a
systematic error in remembering a target toward the prototypical location of its region,
increased as a function of distance away from its prototypical location and if time and degree
of distortion moderated the bias. We manipulated eye width along a horizontal axis to create
a set of face stimuli. In Experiment 1, participants saw one face at a time, and after a short
delay, they were asked to reproduce the location of one of the eyes and complete a
recognition task. In Experiment 2, we increased the delay from 2000ms to 5000ms. We
hypothesized and found that bias towards the prototype increased for the moderately
distorted face conditions; however, the decrease in bias in the highly distorted conditions was
not statistically significant. Additionally, bias did not increase over time. We discuss our
results in the context of Huttenlocher et al.’s (1991) category adjustment model, as well as
the practical implications of our study in the field of eyewitness memory.
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Category Bias in Facial Memory
Existing knowledge plays a crucial role in our judgments about a stimulus (e.g.,
Hannigan & Reinitz, 2001). In spatial memory, one well-documented demonstration of the
effect is referred to as the category bias (Huttenlocher, Hedges, & Duncan, 1991). The
category bias is a systematic error in locating a stimulus in relation to the superordinate
category to which the stimulus belongs. These distortions in memory of locations are very
common and have been found with a variety of stimuli and tasks (Hund & Plumert, 2002;
Sampaio & Wang, 2009). For example, judgments of relative location between two cities are
biased according to the relative location of the states the cities belong to (Stevens & Coupe,
1978). Thus, individuals incorrectly infer that San Diego, California is to the west of Reno,
Nevada presumably because of their knowledge that the state of California is generally to the
west of the state of Nevada. More recently, the effect has been extended to memory for facial
features, with the remembered position of an eye within a face showing a systematic bias
towards the prototypical eye location (Sampaio & Symons, 2013). The study of biases in
memory for faces not only is theoretically interesting but also has many practical
implications.
Previous research suggests that people use a diverse array of cognitive processes to
remember and distinguish between faces. These processes range from noting characteristics
of individual features (e.g., eye color) to forming a spatial representation of the distance
between features (see Maurer, Grand, & Mondloch, 2002 for a review). Biases in memory for
faces, including the category bias, can shed light into the accuracy of the processes and
products involved in choosing a person out of a lineup and of creating a sketch of a suspect’s
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face. Similarly, discovering the variables that may moderate the effect of category bias in
memory for faces has important practical applications in forensic settings.
Basic Processes in Face Recognition
Multiple processes have been proposed to explain how people remember and
distinguish between faces. These processes fall under two broad categories. First, featural
processing refers to using characteristics of individual features to remember and distinguish
between faces. Second, configural processing refers to using the relationship between
features to remember and distinguish between faces. Empirical evidence exists for each
proposed mechanism, and the existing literature does not seem to allow for the identification
of a dominant mechanism (see Rakover, 2002 for a critical review).
Featural processing involves using the characteristics of facial features to make
discrimination and recognition judgments (Freire, Lee, & Symons, 2000). Evidence for
featural processing stems from the observation that inverting a face decreases people’s ability
to use configural information to distinguish between and remember faces, but it does not
affect their ability to use featural characteristics. For example, in a series of experiments,
Freire et al. demonstrated that inversion impaired participants’ ability to use configural
information in visual discrimination and recognition tasks. Inversion did not, however,
impair participants’ ability to distinguish between and remember faces with feature
manipulations. Specifically, in one experiment, participants accurately discriminated between
inverted faces with featural differences. In a second experiment using a forced-choice
recognition task, where the inverted target face and inverted foil face differed in feature
characteristics, participants accurately chose the target face. Additionally, Barton, Keenan,
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and Bass (2001) found that inverting a face selectively disrupted participants’ ability to
discern changes in the distance between features but not for changes in eye color. Finally,
Leder and Bruce (2000) found that inversion impaired participants’ memory performance on
a recognition task for faces with spacing manipulations but not for faces with hair, mouth,
and eye color manipulations.
Similar to the inversion literature, neurological research provides additional evidence
that featural and configural processing represent two discrete mechanisms in face processing.
Le Grand, Mondloch, Maurer, and Brent (2001), for example, tested the ability of patients
who had bilateral cataracts early in life to discriminate between faces with featural and
configural manipulations. Specifically, patients viewed pairs of faces; some faces had
different features (e.g., different mouths), and some faces had spacing differences (e.g., the
distance between the eyes differed between the faces). Patients were sensitive to featural
changes; however, compared to controls, patients performed poorly when discriminating
between faces that differed in the spacing between features. The purpose of the experiment
was to determine if a critical period for developing the ability to use configural information
exists, that is, the study sought to determine whether people who are born blind and regain
their sight later in life can develop the ability to use configural information. The results
showed that patients could only use featural information to distinguish between faces, and
controls could use configural or featural information (depending on the stimuli),
demonstrating that featural processing represents a discrete mechanism in face processing.
In contrast to featural processing, configural processing refers to the way in which
people use the entire face during recognition. Holistic processing represents one of three
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subtypes of configural processing. In holistic processing, the entire face is encoded as a
complete, integrated unit. Research supporting holistic processing focuses on how people
remember facial information better when it is given in the context of the whole face. For
example, Farah, Wilson, Tanaka, and Drain (1998) found superior recognition accuracy for
faces that were identical to acquisition items or completely different. Participants performed
significantly worse on a recognition test when the face contained a target feature from the old
face and the irrelevant, or foil, features were different (e.g., the same eyes as the old face but
a different jaw, nose, mouth, etc.). Valentine and Bruce (1986a, 1986b) observed that their
participants were significantly slower in recognizing jumbled, distinctive faces than
recognizing jumbled, prototypical (i.e., average looking) faces. Both Farah et al. and
Valentine and Bruce argue, albeit using a different vocabulary, that face recognition involves
a matching process, whereby people use their memory for an entire face as a template and
attempt to match it to the face they are trying to identify.
A second subtype of configural processing is first-order relational processing. This
type of processing involves using the basic relationship between features to identify stimuli
as faces; for example, eyes are always above the nose, and the nose is always above the
mouth. Imaging research using fMRI supports first-order relational processing by
demonstrating a distinctive pattern of neural activity when people view faces over other types
of stimuli (Haxby et al., 2001). Moreover, Baenninger (1994) tested recognition accuracy for
faces with configural modifications and found a significant decline in accuracy when the
faces contained disrupted first-order relations (e.g., the nose located at the top of the head).
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The third subtype of configural processing is second-order relational processing. This
type of processing refers to the ways in which people use spatial relations between features to
remember and discriminate between faces. People display a remarkable level of accuracy for
detecting these distances. Using a simple recognition task (i.e., at recognition, participants
were asked to judge if the presented face was the same or different as the acquisition face),
Haig (1984) observed that his participants’ just noticeable difference (JND) for eye
movements was between 1.75 and 2.53 pixels. Evidence for the importance of second-order
processing comes from the observation that inverting faces both impairs recognition accuracy
(e.g., Yin, 1969; Rhodes et al., 1989) and impairs people’s ability to accurately gauge
distances between features (Barton et al., 2001; Leder & Bruce, 2000). Specifically, the
inversion literature demonstrates that when faces are upright, people use spatial relationships
to make accurate discrimination and recognition judgments.
In sum, facial memory involves featural processing and three types of configural
processing. Holistic processing refers to using the entire face as a template and engaging in a
matching process (Valentine & Bruce, 1986, 1986b; Farah et al., 1998). First-order relational
processing refers to using basic relationships between features to recognize stimuli as faces
(Haxby et al., 2001; Baenninger, 1994). Second-order relational processing refers to the way
in which people use spatial relationships to recognize faces and discriminate between faces
(Haig, 1984; Barton et al., 2001; Leder & Bruce, 2000). While evidence exists for all types of
processing, there is no clear conclusion about which process is dominant (Rakover, 2002)
Schemata
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Examining facial memory using schema theory may help elucidate a specific process
through which facial memory, or at least reports from memory, can become biased. All
schema theories propose that existing knowledge structures provide a context for encoding
new information and that existing knowledge affects what information is encoded (Alba &
Hasher, 1983). Minksy’s (1975) frame theory, for example, offers a useful way to
conceptualize the way in which a schema serves as a template for encoding new information.
Minsky uses the term “frame” to describe the existing knowledge structure that represents a
schematic instance (p. 1). Within each frame, multiple terminals exist for representing
detailed information. For example, an office frame may have a terminal for a desk, chair,
bookshelf, computer, etc. Each terminal comes already assigned with a default value (i.e., an
average looking desk, chair, bookshelf, etc.). When a person encounters a new office, the
existing frame functions as a template, and the person adjusts default values to account for
specific details (e.g., noting the specific type of desk). If a person fails to encode details for a
terminal, default values are automatically used.
The formation of a face schema or prototype may reflect some measure of central
tendency (Solso & McCarthy, 1981). For instance, in their experiment, Solso and McCarthy
took a generic face template used by police and generated variations from it in such a way
that that some features occurred at a higher frequency (e.g., one particular mouth occurred at
a higher frequency in the acquisition stimuli). During the acquisition phase, participants
viewed ten variations of the prototype face but not the prototype itself. The recognition test
immediately following encoding, as well as a second test that occurred six weeks later,
revealed that while in general participants displayed high levels of accuracy in distinguishing
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old from new faces, the prototype face elicited extremely high false alarm rates (only one
subject did not falsely recognize the prototype). Additionally, participants had higher
confidence levels for the prototype face than for the faces they actually viewed. Solso and
McCarthy suggested that people may generate a prototype based on the integration of
multiple frequency distributions. In Solso and McCarthy’s study, people seem to have
combined the modal facial features in the acquisition stimuli to generate a prototypical face.
Although the Solso and McCarthy’s (1981) study examined the formation of a prototype
based on integrating modal facial features, a similar process could account for the formation
of a prototype based on the location of facial features or the spatial relationships between
features. For example, a person may generate a frequency distribution for the width between
a person’s eyes. Eye width on their prototype face reflects the mean width from a frequency
distribution. This complex, unconscious process may represent the underlying process in
schema formation.
Research using word lists as the stimuli has found similar results. For example,
Roediger and McDermott (1995) used Deese’s (1959) original word lists, built around a
critical word (e.g., a word list containing a list of specific types of fruit when the critical
word is “fruit”), to test memory. Recall rates for non-presented, critical words were equal to
or greater than the items participants studied. During recognition testing, participants
displayed approximately equal false alarm and hit rates; that is, participants were just as
likely to recognize the non-presented, critical words as the words they actually viewed during
the acquisition phase. Additionally, participants expressed high confidence levels for critical
words. As one possible explanation, Roediger and McDermott suggested a schema-based
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hypothesis for their results; specifically, the critical words may represent the prototype for
the word lists, and participants were making schema-based inference errors.
Selection represents one of the basic mechanisms of schemata (Alba & Hasher,
1983). Selection refers to the way in which existing knowledge structures influence which
stimuli are attended to and thus remembered. Specifically, highly developed knowledge
structures, or schemata, allow for efficient integration of new information. In contrast, adding
new information without a background context is a relatively inefficient process.
Face memory research has shown that face schemata facilitate memory for schematic
faces and that the absence of a schema for a type of face (e.g., inverted or other-race faces)
hinders memory. For instance, Goldstein (1975) demonstrated that inversion affects
recognition accuracy for adults more than it does for children. Goldstein suggests that the
development of highly tuned facial schemata may help adults remember upright faces but
detract from their ability to recognize schema atypical, inverted faces. Additionally,
Goldstein and Chance (1980) demonstrated that children show less susceptibility to the ownrace effect (i.e., the tendency to make significantly more errors when trying to remember
faces of a different race). Goldstein and Chance’s study revealed that Caucasian children’s
memory for Japanese and Caucasian faces increases through grade six. During that time,
children show similar accuracy levels for both types of faces. In contrast, Caucasian adults
display a wide discrepancy in recognition accuracy levels between Caucasian and Japanese
faces. Similar to the schema explanation for inversion effects, Goldstein and Chance argue
that—because prolonged and repeated exposure leads to complex but inflexible face
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schemata—adults have finely tuned own-race face schemata that help them remember
schematic faces but detract from their ability to remember schema atypical faces.
Although evidence demonstrates that schemata provide a template for encoding that
enhances memory, other research suggests that schema atypical stimuli may draw additional
attentional resources that enhance memory (Johnston, Hawley, Plewe, Elliott, & DeWitt,
1990). In their experiment, Johnston et al. presented participants with long sequences of four
words arranged in a spatial configuration (i.e., an array consisting of four boxes). Some
words occurred at a high frequency (familiar words), while other words appeared
infrequently (novel words). On each trial, participants viewed an array with a different word
in each of the four boxes. Following a delay, participants viewed the same array with the
probed word in all four boxes. Participants then indicated the location of the probed word in
the array they viewed during the acquisition phase; for example, if the word “dog” appeared
in the top box during the acquisition phase, the participant should select the top box during
the test phase. When compared with familiar words, participants displayed higher levels of
accuracy for the infrequently occurring, novel words, an effect the authors termed “novel pop
out.”
After a series of replications (Johnston, Hawley, & Farnham, 1993), Johnston,
Hawley, and Farnham (1994) proposed mismatch theory. Mismatch theory postulates that
when viewing familiar stimuli, schema-driven processing dominates and serves to conserve
cognitive resources; moreover, an inhibition of data-driven, bottom-up processing
accompanies schema-driven processing. However, upon viewing a schema atypical stimulus,
“novel pop out” shifts perception to data-driven processing. Johnson et al. conjecture that the
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“novel pop out” effect serves an evolutionary function by counterbalancing top-down,
schema-driven processing.
Research using scenes as stimuli provides additional evidence for the attention
postulate of schema theory (Friedman, 1979). Friedman presented participants with scenes
containing schematic and schema atypical stimuli. During the experiment, participants’ eye
movements were monitored. Results indicated that participants spent more time starting at
schema atypical stimuli, suggesting that schema consistency affects attention allocation.
Additionally, recognition testing revealed that participants were more likely to notice
changes in schema atypical stimuli and make correct rejections.
Additional evidence for the attention postulate of schema theory using scenes as
stimuli comes from Gordon (2004). Gordon presented participants with scenes containing
schematic (e.g., a motorcycle at a gas station) and schema atypical (e.g., a harp at a gas
station) stimuli. Following a delay, participants were shown a probe (an ampersand or
percentage sign) and were instructed to press the mouse key corresponding to the correct
symbol (e.g., left click if the symbol is an ampersand). When participants viewed scenes for
longer than 150ms, they showed faster reaction times when the symbol occurred at the
location of the schema atypical object. This suggests that participants focused their attention
on the location of the schema atypical stimuli, providing additional support for the attention
postulate of schema theory.
In addition to previously discussed stimulus domains, evidence suggests that the
attention postulate of schema theory applies to facial memory (Perkins, 1991). Perkins
examined the role of attention and schemata in the context of facial memory by presenting
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participants with either a schematic face or a schema atypical face (e.g., a face with the nose
located on top of the head). At recognition, participants were presented with two cards
containing the target feature and a distracter feature, both in isolation (e.g., two noses). The
results of the forced-choice recognition test indicated that participants were more accurate at
recognizing features from schema atypical faces, suggesting that participants allocated their
attention to the schema atypical faces, which enhanced recognition accuracy.
In sum, research suggesting that, through exposure, people develop complex
schemata for own-race and upright faces that enhance memory is supported by the
observation that exposure duration is associated with increased recognition accuracy for
frequently seen faces and decreased recognition accuracy for infrequently seen faces
(Goldstein, 1975; Goldstein and Chance, 1980). In contrast, a separate body of literature
suggests that schema atypical stimuli—including faces—affect attention allocation and
recognition accuracy (Friedman, 1979; Johnston et al., 1990; Perkins, 1991; Gordon, 2004).
Although this research may seem contradictory, Johnston et al.’s conjecture that schemadriven processing and processing associated with the “novel pop out” effect both occur and
counterbalance each other offers a resolution.
In addition to providing a template for encoding and influencing attention, multiple
studies have demonstrated the effect schemata have in guiding responses in recall and
recognition tasks. For example, in a classic study, Bartlett (1932) observed that his western
participant sample profoundly altered a Native American folktale during a recall test;
specifically, they modified the structure and content in the direction of a schematic story
from western culture (as cited in Brewer, 2000). Brewer and Treyens (1981) brought
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participants into a graduate student’s office under the guise that they needed to wait until the
experiment was ready. Afterwards, participants’ memory for objects in the office was tested.
An examination of errors in recall and recognition tests revealed that participants inferred the
presence of objects typically found in a graduate students office (e.g., books and pencils) that
were absent from the office, which suggests that episodic information becomes integrated
with existing, schematic knowledge for offices. Similarly, Hannigan and Reinitz (2001)
demonstrated inference errors in procedural schemata (e.g., remembering buying meat at the
grocery store when that event was absent from the acquisition phase) and causal-inference
errors (e.g., remembering someone taking an orange from the bottom of the pile when shown
a picture of oranges all over the floor in the acquisition phase).
In the context of facial memory, schemata may also guide responses. Goldstein,
Stephenson, and Chance (1977) analyzed false alarm results from six studies. Frequency
distributions revealed that certain faces consistently elicited false alarms; that is, the
distribution of false alarms among foils was non-random. Offering a possible explanation,
Goldstein et al. postulated that faces eliciting high false alarm rates may represent a
prototype; that is, the faces may appear as a composite of modal facial features from the
population. Solso and McCarthy’s (1981) observation that participants expressed more
confidence in having seen a prototype face, generated by integrating modal features, than for
the faces they actually viewed supports Goldstein et al.’s conjecture.
Schemata and Spatial Memory
Huttenlocher et al.’s (1991) category adjustment model (CA) represents a version of
schema theory that was developed to examine spatial memory; therefore, it is a useful model
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for examining second-order relational processing (i.e., people’s memory for spatial
relationships between features) in facial memory. Consistent with schema theory, the model
proposes that existing knowledge structures influence the processing of and memory for
incoming information. Unlike schema theories that make qualitative predictions about the
effect of schemata on memory (e.g., testing recognition accuracy for schematic vs. atypical
stimuli), the CA model details an underlying mechanism, based on Bayes’ principles, that
explains how spatial category (a coarse-grain representation) and coordinate information for
a target location (a fine-grain representation) interact.
The CA model is related to Minsky’s (1975) frame theory. Through the process of
coarse-grain coding, people divide a space into categories. Within each category, people
generate a central, prototypical location; that is, the prototype reflects the location that would
minimize variance if a person guessed the location of a target location over repeated trials.
Central to the CA model is the idea that a new target location is encoded as a distribution of
values, and the precision of encoding determines the spread of the distribution. A fine-grain
value refers to a sample from the distribution of values. At the time of recall, a subject
weighs the fine-grain value with the coarse-grain representation based on the relative strength
of these representations (Huttenlocher et al., 1991). For example, applied to face memory, the
CA model would suggest that if the subject only has a vague memory for the eye location,
they may rely heavily on their knowledge of a prototypical eye location, and place the
recalled eye close to the prototype. At the extreme, if there was no fine-grain representation,
the prototype would be used to estimate the location of a specific eye.
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The category, defined as the distribution of values within category boundaries,
interacts with coordinate, fine-grain memory during the recall test. For example, during a
recall task, a subject may use their memory for the specific eye they viewed during the
acquisition phase and their knowledge of a prototypical eye location (i.e., coarse-grain
representation) to produce an answer. The coarse-grain representation and fine-grain value
differentially affect recall responses depending on the weight placed on each value.
Consistency determines the prototype’s weight; for example, in memory for eye location, if a
subject knows that the eyes are always located in a specific spot, they will heavily weight the
coarse-grain representation. The prototype is thought to function to reduce variance; that is, if
a subject only has a vague memory of where the eye is in a particular face, choosing the
average location in a memory test will, over repeated trials, reduce the mean distance
between the real location and the recalled location (Huttenlocher et al., 1991).
Through the process of truncation, category boundaries confine recalled locations to
the category. Specifically, truncation refers to the process whereby people’s memories for
stimulus values that occur outside inexact category boundaries adjust inwards towards the
prototypical location. For example, if a subject viewed a circle with a dot located slightly
outside the category boundary (i.e., the quadrant of the circle in which the dot is located), the
subject may place the dot inside the quadrant at recall. In addition, the strength of truncation
varies as a function of category boundary inexactness. Specifically, truncation effects
increase as category boundaries becomes more exact (i.e., a single value) and decrease as a
category boundaries become more inexact (i.e., a range of values). With circular spaces,
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Huttenlocher (1991) notes that boundary inexactness results from having to eyeball the
location of the axes dividing the circle into quadrants.
In a series of classic experiments, Huttenlocher et al. (1991) tested the predictions of
the CA model by examining the pattern of dot localization within a circle; specifically,
participants viewed a series of circles, each containing one dot. Combined, the test stimuli set
included dots evenly distributed over the entire circle. After viewing each circle, participants
completed a recall test. Participants displayed a bias away from vertical and horizontal lines,
suggesting that participants mentally break the circle into quadrants when encoding dot
location; that is, they generate category boundaries. Furthermore, bias towards a prototypical
location (i.e., in between the center of the circle and the circumference and along a 45-degree
angle) increased as a distracter task depleted participants’ attentional resources. Taken
together, the results of the experiments provide support for the idea that recall responses
reflect an interaction between fine-grain and coarse-grain representations.
In addition to depleting attentional resources, evidence suggests time increases
category bias. Using a square space (model house), Hund and Plumert (2002) tested the
effect of delay on category bias. Compared with participants tested immediately after
encoding, adults and children tested after a 12-minute delay demonstrated an increased
reliance on the category; that is, participants displayed a pattern of bias towards the center of
the quadrant in which the encoded object was located. Additionally, Sampaio and Wang
(2012) manipulated the delay between encoding (500ms or 3000ms) and retrieval. Results
indicated that time increased the level of bias created by the new category. The increase in
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bias seems to reflect Huttenlocher et al.’s (1991) assumption of the faster rate of decay of the
fine-grain representation compared to the coarse-grain representation.
Although Huttenlocher et al. (1991) originally used the CA model to test memory for
dots inside circles, the model has been extended to other domains such as geography
(Friedman, 2009) and other spaces such as locations within a college campus (Uttal,
Friedman, Hand, & Warren, 2010; Sampaio & Cardwell, 2012). Sampaio and Symons
(2013), for example, took the CA approach to investigate memory for a facial feature
location. Merged with the face inversion effect in perception (Yin, 1969), they hypothesized
that because of extensive exposure to upright faces, people develop a generic face prototype
that affects which information in a particular face is encoded. They further hypothesized that
people hold a more finely-tuned prototype for feature locations in upright faces than in
upside down faces. At the time of retrieval, the position of a feature should be adjusted with
the prototypical location of that feature within a prototypical face. Based on Huttenlocher et
al.’s (1991) category adjustment model, they expected and found that the prototype value on
upright faces is indeed more precise/less variable than that in inverted faces, and that
memory for specific feature locations in the former case showed a larger category bias than
in the latter case. They interpreted the results as indicating that the relative weighing of the
fine-grain and coarse-grain representations in facial feature localization is a function of the
participants’ degree of certainty.
Experiment 1
Recent data show that people hold a face prototype for upright faces and that category
bias operates in facial memory. However, research has not yet examined what variables may
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moderate the category bias in facial memory. In Experiment 1, we examined how degree of
distortion away from a prototype affected the magnitude of the category bias. We
hypothesized that when viewing prototypical stimuli or stimuli that are moderately distorted
from the prototype, participants would rely on their coarse-grain representation, which would
be reflected by increasing levels of bias as the distance away from the prototype increased.
When viewing stimuli highly distorted from the prototype, however, we predicted an increase
in fine-grain exactness, which would be reflected by a reduced bias in recalled, extreme eye
locations. We manipulated the distance between the eyes to create a set of faces that
contained eyes located moderately distant from the eyes’ prototypical location and a set of
faces that contained eyes located highly distant from their prototypical location (e.g., at the
extreme, these faces have eyes touching at the center). It was hypothesized that memory
performance would be low for the moderately distorted stimuli (Sampaio & Symons , 2013),
as it was expected that estimation of location from memory would heavily reflect the weight
of the prototypical location of the eye. In contrast, it was hypothesized that performance
would be higher for estimates of extreme eye location, as it was expected they would reflect
a heavier weight of the fine-grain representation compared to the moderately distorted
stimuli.
By examining the role of distortion away from the prototype in moderating the
magnitude of category bias, the present study may help resolve inconsistencies in the
literature regarding the effect of schema consistency on facial memory. Previous research has
demonstrated that sometimes schema-inconsistent information enhances memory (e.g.,
Perkins, 1991), and at other times it hinders memory (e.g., Goldstein, 1975). In this project,
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we tried to address the question of whether level of distortion from the prototype/schema can
explain the discrepancy; that is, we hypothesized that the degree of distortion plays a crucial
role in memory for schema atypical information, with the degree of distortion from a
schema/prototype determining fine-grain inexactness. With respect to this project, we
hypothesized that the magnitude of the bias would vary as a function of the level of distortion
of a particular eye location from its prototypical location. Specifically, we expected that the
magnitude of bias would increase as the degree of distortion increases, but only for
moderately distorted stimuli, as in Sampaio and Symons (2013). However, as eye location
starts to be highly distorted from its prototypical location, performance would improve,
perhaps because people would start noticing the distortion from the prototype; that is, the
relative weight placed on the coarse-grain and fine-grain representation would shift, resulting
in reduced bias towards the prototype.
The first experiment included three phases, including a prototype identification task, a
recall task, and a recognition task. Because we examined bias that results from integrating a
prototypical eye location, the first phase of the experiment served to identify the prototypical
eye location. Participants marked where they thought the prototypical location of each eye
was for faces with eyes removed. Second, participants completed a recall task for eye
location. Third, participants completed a multiple-choice recognition task. It was
hypothesized that eye location in moderately distorted faces would show lower accuracy than
in highly distorted faces, because high distortions would reduce fine-grain inexactness,
resulting in a shift in the weight placed on the prototype and the fine-grain value.
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Method
Participants
Twenty-nine Western Washington University undergraduate psychology students
recruited through the SONA system participated in this study for course credit. Fourteen
participants were male, and 15 participants were female. Twenty-seven participants were
right handed, and two participants were left handed.
Materials
Acquisition Items.
Twelve face sets were created. From each of the 12 base faces, eight variations were
created by changing the spacing between the eyes, for a total of 96 acquisition faces. All
faces were adult Caucasian males. The eye spacing on each face was adjusted inward and
outward, with the exact spacing amount dependent on the width of the face. The width
adjustment for all eight variations was identical. Eyes were moved along a horizontal axis,
and width adjustments ranged from four to eight pixels. Four faces had four pixel
adjustments, four faces had five pixel adjustments, three faces had six pixel adjustments, and
one face had eight pixel adjustments. When viewed on the computer monitors used for the
experiment, mean face width was 164.75 millimeters (SD = 13.53), and mean face height was
259.25 millimeters (SD = 7.50).
Test Stimuli.
For the recognition test, all 96 acquisition faces were used to create 12 multiplechoice arrays (12 arrays displaying all 8 variations of a base face); each array included eight
faces with equal spacing measurements. We numbered faces one through eight, with one
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denoting the face with eyes touching in the center and eight denoting the face with eyes
touching the outer edge of the face (see Appendix A and B for complete list of stimuli used
in experiment). In addition, for the recall test, there were 12 response faces created by
removing the eyes on the base faces and filling in the space with a neutral skin tone.
Design
The present study used a fully within-participants design. In the first phase of the
experiment, participants were presented with all 12 base faces and marked where they
thought the pupil should be located. In the second phase, all participants viewed all 96 face
stimuli twice. For the first block of 96 faces, participants reproduced the location of the eye
on the right side of the screen. For the second block of 96 faces, participants reproduced the
location of the eye on the left side of the screen. In the third phase of the experiment, all
participants viewed all 96 faces and completed a recognition test. For both the recall and
recognition test, the order the faces appeared in was randomized.
Procedure
Upon arriving to the lab, the experimenter directed each participant into one of four
private rooms, each containing a desktop computer. We used E-Prime software to administer
the experiment. The experimenter started the program, entered the participant number, the
session number, the participant’s sex, entered their handedness (determined by asking the
participant), and their own researcher ID number. After reviewing the accuracy of the
information, the experimenter started the program and returned to the center room. Next, a
screen displayed instructing participants to use their mouse curser to mark where they
thought the pupil of an eye should be. When viewed on the computer screen, faces were
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looking straight ahead. After pressing the space bar, a second screen appeared reiterating the
instructions. After pressing the space bar a second time, a priming screen appeared telling
participants whether to mark the location of the pupil on the right or left side of the screen.
Next, a face where the eyes had been replaced with a neutral skin tone appeared, and
participants used their mouse curser to mark the location of the right or left pupil. The
process repeated until the participants marked pupil location for all 12 base faces.
Upon completion of the prototype identification stage, a screen displayed that
instructed participants to remember the position of the eye on the right side of the screen for
the first set of faces and the eye on the left side of the screen for the second set of faces. For
each trial, a face appeared for 300ms, followed by a mask for 500ms (a red grid) and a black
screen for 1500ms (for a total of 2000ms delay). After 2000ms, an eyeless response face
corresponding to the acquisition face appeared, and participants market their recalled location
of the eye using the mouse curser. After marking their recalled location, a screen appeared
instructing participants to rate their confidence by selecting a key from 1 to 7, with large
numbers indicating higher levels of confidence. After participants completed the first block
of 96 faces, an intermission screen appeared instructing participants to remember the location
of the left eye. The second test block was identical to the first block.
Upon completion of the recall task, a screen displayed instructing participants to
remember the face they were about to see. After pressing the space bar to start the test, a
single face appeared for 300ms, followed immediately by the multiple-choice test screen
displaying eight variations of the face they viewed. Participants indicated the face they
recognized by pressing the numerical key corresponding to their selection. After making their
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selection, a screen displayed asking participants to use the same 7-point confidence scale to
rate their level of confidence. This process repeated for all 96 faces.
Results
Experiment 1 tested the role of level of distortion away from a prototype in
moderating category bias in facial memory; specifically, we predicted that bias would
increase as a function of distance away from the prototype. However, in the extremely
distorted conditions, we predicted a decrease in bias resulting from the effect of schemainconsistency; that is, schema-inconsistency would result in a heavier weight being placed on
participants’ fine-grain representation.
To prepare the data for analysis, we first eliminated face one from the analysis, as the
inward and outward manipulations different by one unit, making this face different from
faces two through 12. Specifically, pixel width between all eight conditions was not equal in
face one. Second, to prevent outliers from impeding identification of accurate prototype, we
trimmed values exceeding 25 units away from a central eye location (manipulation condition
4) (n = 9 or 5.7% of the data). Although the chosen, central location was arbitrary, 77% of
trimmed outliers exceed 94 units away from manipulation four, meaning—in addition to
being on the other side of the screen—they would be in excess of 25 units away from any of
the face manipulation conditions. Third, we trimmed recall responses exceeding 25 units (n =
148 or 6.6% of the data) away from the true location; keeping these aberrant data would
unjustly inflate our effect size. Fourth, because the program used for the experiment had a
glitch, all left eye location values had the same number; we removed these data from our
analysis. We followed the standard procedure to quantify bias, by subtracting the true
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location from the recalled location. To examine differences in confidence and reaction time
between correct and incorrect responses, we created a dummy coded column for recall and
recognition data. For recall data, a zero denotes that the recalled location was within 3 units
of the true location, and a one denotes that the recalled location exceeded 3 units away from
the correct location. For the recognition test, a zero denotes that the participant chose the
correct face.
This study examined bias as a function of distance away from a prototypical eye
location. To identify the prototypical location, we calculated the mean selected x coordinate
(i.e., the location on the horizontal axis) for right eye location for each face, as well as the
average location for the face set. Next, we performed a two-tailed, one-sample t-test
comparing participants’ selected prototype eye location to the closest manipulation condition.
Participants’ selected prototype (M = 374.78, SD = 6.45) was not significantly different from
eye location in condition five (M = 376.55), t(28) = -1.48, p > .05.
We analyzed recall data using a within-participants ANOVA. Our data did not meet
the sphericity assumption; therefore, we interpreted our results using the Huynh-Feldt
adjustment. The ANOVA revealed a main effect of distance away from the prototype on bias,
F(1.96, 53) = 7.42, p < .05, partial ƞ2 = .215. Planned polynomial contrasts revealed that our
data follow a significant cubic trend; that is, bias increased as a function of distance away
from the prototype, and participants adjusted responses inwards from the edge of the face and
outwards from the center of the face, F(1, 27) = 6.11, p < .05.
Although the cubic trend emerged as significant (see figure 1), we tested the
significance of the reduction in bias by performing a linear regression using manipulation
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conditions two through seven. If the trend was linear (i.e., there was no drop in bias in the
extreme conditions), the predicted values from the regression for manipulation conditions
one and eight should not be significantly different from the obtained values. We performed
one-sample t-tests comparing the obtained values against the predicted values. Manipulation
condition one (M = 1.70, SD = 5.14) was not significantly different from the predicted value
(M = 2.994), t(27) = -1.33, p > .05. Manipulation condition eight (M = -2.64, SD = 5.3) was
not significantly different from the predicted value (X = -3.5), t(27) = .859, p > .05. In sum,
although the upward trend in bias as eye location moved away from the prototype decreased
abruptly in the extreme conditions, the reductions were not significantly different from a
linear trend.
Following Haig’s (1984) observation that his participants were more sensitive to
inward than outward horizontal eye manipulations, we compared the absolute value of
inward and outward manipulation bias using a paired samples t-test. The test revealed that
the difference in bias between outward (M = 3.34, SD = 2.44) and inward (M = 3.07, SD =
2.19) manipulation conditions was not significantly different, t(27) = -.373, p = > .05.
Turning to recognition data, a X2 test of independence revealed that the face
participants recognized face was dependent on the face they viewed during the acquisition
phase, X2(49, N = 2552) = 5019, p < .001. Descriptive statistics (see Table 1), suggest that
when participants committed a false alarm, the majority adjusted their responses outwards in
manipulation conditions one, two (88.2%), and three (77.1%). Additionally, most participants
adjusted their responses inwards in manipulation conditions eight, seven (88.5%), and six
(77.9%). In manipulation conditions four and five, Q-Q plots suggest false alarms are
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relatively evenly distributed around the prototype. This observation, however, needs to be
interpreted cautiously, as both distributions failed Kolmogorov-Smirnov’s test of normality.
Confidence levels for recall responses within 3 units of the true location (M = 4.92,
SD = .85) were significantly higher than confidence responses for recalled locations
exceeding 3 units away from the true location (M = 4.78, SD = .89), t(27) = 2.61, p = < .05.
Examining recognition data, participants were not more confident when they chose the
correct (M = 5.27, SD = .783) location over the incorrect location (M = 5.274, SD = .78),
t(28) = -.117, p = > .05.
We examined the effect of manipulation condition on reaction time using withinparticipants ANOVA. To adjust for a violation of sphericity, we interpreted the results using
the Huynh-Felt adjustment. The ANOVA revealed a main effect of manipulation condition
on reaction time, F(6.08, 164.14) = 2.16, p = < .05, partial ƞ2 = .074. Planned pair-wise
comparisons between conditions one (M= 2295.71, SD = 1022.14) and two (M = 2165.67, SD
= 927.13) revealed a borderline statistical trend t(27) = 1.61, p = .12. Planned pair-wise
comparisons between conditions seven (M = 2141.5, SD = 163.58) and eight (M = 2342.06,
SD = 174.2) revealed a significant increase in reaction time, t(27) = -2.411, p = < .05.
Manipulation condition did not affect reaction time for recognition responses, F(5.75,
137.89) = .993, p = > .05, partial ƞ2 = .04.
Turning to reaction time and accuracy, a paired samples t-test revealed that
participants displayed shorter reaction times when recalling a location within three units of
the true location (M = 2097.6, SD = 827.052) than when recalling a location exceeding three
unites away from the true location (M = 2252.18, SD = 882.12), t(27) = -.2.84, p < .05.
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Additionally, participants displayed significantly shorter reaction times when recognizing the
correct face (M = 714.52, SD = 188.09) than the incorrect face (M = 885.93, SD = 256.85),
t(28) = -4.65, p < .001.
Discussion
Results from Experiment 1 are consistent with previous work demonstrating the
category bias in facial memory (Sampaio & Symons, 2013). Recall data demonstrated that
participants adjusted their responses towards a prototypical eye location, with the level of
bias increasing as a function of distance away from the prototype. The pattern of false alarms
obtained in the recognition test also confirms the category bias; that is, when participants
chose the incorrect face, they selected faces with eyes closer to the prototype.
Experiment 1 found a mean decrease in bias in the extreme conditions; however, the
decrease did not approach statistical significance. Given the small effect size of the omnibus
ANOVA and the subtlety of the biases, the lack of statistical significance may reflect a lack
of statistical power. Response time data reveal that participants took significantly longer
when making a recall response in condition eight than in condition seven. The increase in
reaction time between conditions two and one narrowly missed being a statistical trend. The
significant increase in reaction time demonstrates that a change is occurring between the
moderately and highly distorted conditions; however, interpreting the meaning of the
increase in reaction time in the context of the CA model and schema-consistency literature
requires additional investigation.
Participants displayed significantly reduced response times when recalling a location
within three units of the true coordinates. Additionally, participants displayed higher
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confidence levels when recalling a location within three units of the true coordinates. A
relationship between confidence and response time may exist, whereby participants make
faster decisions when they are confident in their responses. Additionally, mean biases were
lowest at the prototype, suggesting that many of the correct recall responses occurred at or
near the prototype. At the prototype, coarse-grain and fine-grain representations reinforce
each other, and relying on either representation—or any differentially weighted
combination—would yield an accurate response. Consistency between these representations
may account for the decrease in response times.
Experiment 2
Time is known to affect the degree of category bias in spatial memory tasks, such that
in general there is a larger bias with time (Hund & Plumert, 2002; Sampaio & Wang, 2012).
The effect is thought to be due to the coordinate information fading more rapidly than the
spatial category, and thus in estimating locations from memory, more weight is given to the
former rather than the latter. Experiment 2 examined the effect of time on category bias in
the context of facial memory. In Experiment 2, we increased the delay from 2000ms to
5000ms. In Sampaio and Wang (2009), a response time of 5000ms was used in the longdelay condition. We continued to manipulate distortion away from the prototype by varying
eye location.
Method
Participants
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Twenty-two Western Washington University undergraduate psychology students
recruited through the SONA system participated in this study for course credit. Nine
participants were male and 13 participants were female. Two participants were left handed
and 20 participants were right handed.
Materials
The same materials used for Experiment 1 were used for Experiment 2. To keep the
experiment under 60 minutes and prevent participant fatigue, Experiment 2 randomly
selected and used six base faces instead of 12. The prototype identification stage used six
base faces without eyes. Acquisition stimuli for the recall and recognition task consisted of
48 faces, six base faces with 8 equal horizontal eye manipulations. Test stimuli for the recall
task consisted of six response faces with the eyes removed and filled with a neutral skin tone.
Test stimuli for the recognition task consisted of six multiple-choice slides in the same
configuration as Experiment 1.
Design
Experiment 2 used a fully within-participants design. The prototype identification
stage consisted of six trials, one for each base face. The recall test consisted of 96 trials
divided into two blocks. The multiple-choice recognition test consisted of 48 trials in a single
block. For both the recall and recognition task, participants viewed all six base faces in all
eight configurations. For both the recall and recognition test, we randomized the order the
faces appeared in.
Procedure
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Experiment 2 used the same testing procedure as Experiment 1; however, we
increased the delay from 2000ms to 5000ms.
Results
Experiment 1 examined the effect of schema inconsistency in moderating the
category bias in facial memory. To test a second moderating variable and elaborate on the
results obtained in Experiment 1, Experiment 2 examined the effect of time in moderating the
category bias, as well as the persistence of schema atypical effects.
We performed the same data preparation procedures as Experiment 1. For the
prototype data, we trimmed eight values (13% of data set); all values exceeded 91 units away
from condition four. For the recall data, we trimmed 108 values (11.7%) of data set.
Additionally, subject nine told the experimenter that they did not become aware of the
instructions until halfway through the experiment; we excluded this participant from the
analyses.
We performed one-sample t-tests comparing participants’ selected prototypical eye
location against the closest face manipulation condition. Participants’ mean selected
prototype eye location (M = 375.41, SD = 5.25) was closest to manipulation condition four
(M = 372.8), t(19) = 2.22 , p = < .05. Experiment 2 used fewer faces to keep the experiment
within 60 minutes; this may account for the discrepancy in prototype faces between
Experiment 1 and two.
Figure 2 displays bias plotted against manipulation condition. We performed a
within-participants ANOVA to test the effect of manipulation condition. Our data did not
possess sphericity; therefore, we interpreted our results using the Huynh-Feldt adjustment.
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The ANOVA revealed no main effect of manipulation condition on bias, F(2.26, 42.96) =
.804, p = .468, partial ƞ2= .041.
Turning to recognition data, a X2 test of independence revealed that participants’
recognized face was dependent on the face manipulation condition viewed during the
acquisition phase, X2(49, N = 880) = 2157, p < .001. Recognition results (see Table 2)
partially resemble the pattern found in Experiment 1. When participants committed a false
alarm in manipulation conditions one, two, and three, the majority of participants adjusted
their responses outwards. In manipulation conditions eight, seven, and six, the majority of
participants adjusted their responses inwards. Unlike Experiment 1, however, false alarms
were not evenly distributed around manipulation conditions four and five. The same sample
that yielded the bizarre response patterns in the recall task may account for this discrepancy.
Confidence levels for recalled locations within 3 units of the correct location (M =
4.81, SD = .84) were not different from confidence levels for recalled locations exceeding 3
units away from the true location (M = 4.75, SD = .68), t(19) = .771, p = .45. Examining
recognition data, confidence levels for correct responses (M = 5.57, SD = .55) were
significantly higher than confidence levels for incorrect responses (M = 5.03, SD = .52), t(20)
= 8.104, p < .01.
We used a within-participants ANOVA to examine the relationship between
manipulation condition and reaction time. The data met the sphericity assumption, X2(27) =
31.49, p = .265. Similar to the lack of an effect in the omnibus ANOVA for bias, eye location
did not affect reaction time, F(7, 133) = .612, p = .745, partial ƞ2 = .031. A statistical trend
suggests than participants may display lower reaction times when recognizing a correct face
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(M= 867.86, SD = 281.49) than recognizing an incorrect face (M = 1047.36, SD = 372.97),
t(20) = -1.96, p = .064.
Discussion
The graph plotting bias against manipulation condition (see Figure 2) follows a
downward, step-like pattern and does not match any type of polynomial contrast. This is
inconsistent with the CA model (Huttenlocher, et al., 1991) and the results from Experiment
1. Additionally, previous research examining the effect of time on the category bias
demonstrates that bias increases over longer delay periods (Hund & Plumert, 2002; Sampaio
& Wang, 2012). The reduction in bias across conditions in Experiment 2 violates basic
principles of memory and likely reflects a statistical anomaly. The sample in Experiment 2
consisted of undergraduate psychology students who waited until the end of the quarter to
fulfill their research credit requirement. The unusual data may reflect an aberrant sample;
perhaps participant nine was the only one to admit they did not follow the instructions.
Furthermore, trimming rates (i.e., the percentage of data values that had to be removed
because they were outliers) were approximately twice as large as they were in experiment 1,
which provides additional support for the aberrant sample conjecture.
In contrast to recall data, recognition data are consistent with the CA model; that is,
the pattern of false alarms suggest that when participants error, they choose a face closer to
the prototype. Additionally, and unlike the recall data, responses in the recognition data were
dependent upon the manipulation condition viewed during the acquisition phase.
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General Discussion
The present study found a systematic bias towards a prototypical eye location after a
delay of 2000ms. With recall data in Experiment 1, the study possessed adequate statistical
power to detect the category bias in the omnibus ANOVA, but it was not sufficient to detect
a significant difference between moderately and highly distorted conditions. Recall data from
Experiment 2 revealed no effect of eye position on bias; therefore, we cannot draw
conclusions concerning the effect of time on category bias for recalled locations and whether
schema atypical effects for recalled locations persist over longer delay intervals.
The results of Experiment 1 are consistent with the CA model (Huttenlocher et al.,
1991) and provide a replication of research demonstrating the category bias in facial memory
(Sampaio and Symons, 2013). Several, compatible explanations exist to explain our pattern
of results. First, at the prototype, coarse-grain and fine-grain representations match each
other; that is, the coarse-grain representation is the prototype and the encoded stimulus (i.e.,
the fine-grain representation) was presented at the prototype. Regardless of how participants
weighted each representation, bias would remain extremely low. Second, participants placed
progressively heavier weights on their coarse-grain representation as the stimulus moved
away from the prototype.
Although our lack of statistical power prevented the identification of a significant
effect of extreme distortion on bias reduction, examining possible explanations for the mean
decrease in bias in the extreme conditions warrants consideration. Huttenlocher et al. (1991)
demonstrated that when participants’ attentional resources were depleted by completing a
distracter task during the experiment, category bias increased; that is, as the fine-grain
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representation became more inexact, participants’ relied more heavily on their coarse-grain
representation. Although we manipulated degree of distortion, previous research examining
the attention postulate of schema theory offers two explanations (Friedman, 1979; Johnston
et al., 1990; Gordon, 2004).
Friedman (1979) and Gordon (2004) demonstrated that participants’ focused their
attention on schema atypical features in a scene. Although we specifically instructed our
participants to remember eye location, any differences in the amount of time spent attending
to eye position should have affected the weight participants placed on their fine-grain
representation. If the same effect that occurred in the Friedman study and the Gordon study
was operating in our study, participants should have spent comparatively more time
observing eye location in the extreme conditions, which would have affected fine-grain
inexactness and the degree of category bias. To examine this conjecture in more depth, future
research could monitor participants’ eye gaze.
A second explanation stems from the mismatch theory research examining novel pop
out effects (Johnston et al. 1990; Johnston et al., 1993; Johnston et al., 1994). Specifically,
novel stimuli may induce qualitative changes in processing. With familiar, schematic stimuli,
top down, schema-driven processing dominates; however, novel stimuli result in a shift
towards data-driven processing. Conceptually, mismatch theory is compatible with the CA
model. When viewing prototypical or moderately distorted stimuli, schema-driven processing
may dominate, resulting in a comparatively heavy weight, reflected by bias, being placed on
the coarse-grain representation. However, in the extreme conditions, the processing change
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associated with the novel pop out effect may dominate, resulting in a significant shift in the
weight placed on the fine-grain representation and a reduction in bias.
For the recognition task, the possibility exists that the subtlety of the horizontal eye
movements in our stimuli created a just noticeable difference (JND) problem. Therefore, we
should consider research examining people’s threshold for detecting horizontal eye
manipulations. When JND is defined as above chance accuracy, Haig (1984) demonstrated
that his participants’ JND was 1.75 pixels for inward manipulations and 2.53 pixels for
outward manipulations. In Haig’s study, 1.2 pixels equaled one minute of visual angle, which
Graham (1965) notes nears human visual acuity limitations (as cited in Haig, 1984). When
JND is defined as achieving greater than 75% recognition accuracy, Ge, Luo, Nishimura, and
Lee (2003) observed that the JND for Chinese participants recognizing differences in the
distance between horizontal eye manipulations of Chairman Mao’s face exceed visual acuity
limits (JND = 9.8 pixels for inward manipulations and 11.55 pixels for outward
manipulations). Additionally, using the same criteria, Bredart and Devue (2006) found that
the JND for participants detecting differences in eye width manipulations in their colleagues’
faces were 7.2 pixels for inward manipulations and 8.7 pixels for outward manipulations. Ge
et al. used Adobe Photoshop to manipulate eye width; when Bredart and Devue (2006)
replicated Ge et al.’s research with a different sample and stimuli, they used GIMP with the
same pixel manipulation, suggesting consistency in the pixel measurement tool between
programs. Significant differences between samples, stimuli, experimental designs, and our
lack of viewing distance data make inferences highly speculative. However, on average, the
distance between each manipulation condition was 5 pixels in our study. The previously
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discussed research on JND thresholds indicate that visual acuity limitations may have
affected our recognition data. To address JND concerns, future research could use stimuli
with spatial manipulations within the boundaries of human visual acuity.
In addition to issues raised by visual acuity, field of vision limitations could have
made it difficult for our participants to view both eyes using central, rather than peripheral,
vision. This may have affected fine-grain inexactness, with fine-grain representations
becoming more inexact in the outward manipulations. This conjecture is consistent with the
observation that JND for outward manipulations exceed the JND for inward manipulations
(Haig, 1984; Ge et al., 2003; Bredart & Devue, 2006). My failure to measure viewing
distance prevented us from determining if the eyes on the outward manipulation faces fell
within the 30 degrees of central vision (Spector, 1990). Despite this shortcoming, two
findings in our study suggest that central field of vision limitations did not affect our results.
First, both experiments failed to detect a significant difference in bias between inward and
outward manipulations. Second, if central field of vision limitations increased fine-grain
inexactness, manipulation condition eight should yielded the highest level of bias. Although
the reduction in bias between manipulation conditions seven and eight was not statistically
significant, testing for an increase in bias could not yield a significant result.
Although the literature testing the attention postulate of schema provides a sound
theoretical argument for manipulating attention by varying schema consistency, future
research could experiment with attentional manipulations. For example, researchers could
use the distracter task employed by Huttenlocher (1991), which was found to moderate the
category bias in memory for dots located within circles. Alternatively, researchers could
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manipulate the amount of time participants have to view the stimulus. With either
manipulation, varying the magnitude of the attention manipulation (e.g., the difficulty of the
distracter task or the length of viewing time) would not be methodologically difficult and
would provide a useful elaboration on the effect of attention in moderating category bias.
Specifically, a within-subjects experiment varying attention along a continuum could
determine the point at which decreasing attentional resources yields a significant effect, as
well as the trend in bias (i.e., linear, logarithmic, or exponential, etc.). In sum, alternative
attentional manipulations and continuum manipulations would contribute a useful elaboration
on the effect of attention in moderating category bias in moderating facial memory.
To better ascertain the effect of time on moderating the category bias in facial
memory, manipulating time within-participants would decrease the likelihood of an aberrant
sample comprising a study. Additionally, varying time along a continuum would yield the
same benefits as it would for attention. Specifically, a continuum manipulation would
determine the delay necessary to produce an effect, as well as the function (e.g., does bias
increase in a linear, exponential, or logarithmic manner) the bias follows as time passes.
The accuracy of facial memory has profound implications in our legal system. If the
category adjustment model operates while a witness works with a sketch artist or uses a
computer program to select and place features, the suspect’s face may differ considerably
from the reproduction. When choosing a face out of a lineup, an eyewitness may select a
person with a more prototypical face, as opposed to the suspect.
Although a subtle bias in placing the location of the eyes may seem like minutia in
terms of affecting the overall accuracy of a reproduction, the category bias in facial memory
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may apply to other spatial representations (e.g., the four-way relationship between the eyes,
nose, and mouth). As the number of features affected by the category bias increases, the level
of distortion in the reproduced face will increase. Consequently, future research elaborating
on the category bias and feature relationships will serve a useful function in our criminal
justice system.
Extending from the previously discussed practical implications, but moving away
from spatial memory, future research could examine if a process conceptually related to the
category bias occurs with featural processing. The Solso and McCarthy (1981) study
provided evidence that people form a prototypical face by combining the model features of a
face set. Additionally, Goldstein et al., (1977) postulated that, because of the same type of
modal integration suggested by Solso and McCarthy, their participants committed false
alarms with certain faces at a high frequency. Future research could first identify a
prototypical facial feature in a population. Rich et al. (2008) used a morphing program to
transform a facial expression of emotion from neutral to a strong emotion (e.g., rage).
Researchers could then use the same morphing program to transform a prototypical feature
into a schema atypical feature. Examining recognition accuracy at the prototype, in
moderately distorted conditions, and in highly distorted conditions, as well as patterns in
false alarms (i.e., do participants adjust responses towards the prototype until they reach the
extreme condition) may identify a second process that affects the validity of eyewitness
identification.
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Figure 1. Bias plotted against manipulation condition for recall data in Experiment 1. On the
x-axis, one denotes the condition where the eyes touch in the center of the face, and eight
denotes the condition where the eyes are located at the outer edge of the face. A positive
number on the y-axis indicates that participants adjusted their recalled responses outwards; a
negative number on the y-axis indicates that participants adjusted their responses inwards.
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Figure 2. Mean bias plotted against manipulation condition in Experiment 2. On the x-axis,
one denotes the condition where the eyes touch in the center of the face, and eight denotes
the condition where the eyes are located at the outer edge of the face. A positive number on
the y-axis indicates that participants adjusted their recalled responses outwards; a negative
number on the y-axis indicates that participants adjusted their responses inwards.
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Table 1
Recognition Accuracy Experiment 1

Input
Manipulation
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

1

2

3

62.6%
5.0%
0%
.6%
0%
.3%
.3%
.9%

28.3%
57.8%
9.4%
1.9%
1.3%
.3%
0%
.6%

4.4%
28.1%
58.8%
22.0%
6.3%
2.8%
1.9%
.6%

Response
4
5
2.8%
4.7%
21.9%
50.0%
25.7%
7.5%
2.8%
2.2%

.9%
1.6%
6.3%
20.4%
45.5%
28.8%
11.3%
3.1%

6

7

8

.3%
1.9%
2.8%
4.4%
18.5%
48.9%
40.8%
13.5%

.6%
.9%
.3%
.6%
2.5%
11.0%
38.6%
54.5%

0%
0%
.6%
0%
.3%
.3%
4.4%
24.5%

Note. Table one displays responses by manipulation condition. Input manipulation is
displayed on the vertical column. Responses are listed on the horizontal column.
Percentages denote the percentage of participants who selected each face at recognition.
When the input matches the response, participants chose the correct face. When the
input does not match the response, participants committed a false alarm.
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Table 2
Recognition Accuracy Experiment 2
Input
Manipulation
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

Response
1
69.1%
1.8%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%

2
25.5%
60.0%
2.7%
0%
1.8%
0%
1.8%
0%

3
1.8%
32.7%
63.6%
10.9%
2.7%
2.7%
0%
.9%

4
2.7%
1.8%
30.0%
60.9%
26.4%
3.6%
1.8%
1.8%

5
0%
1.8%
3.6%
20.0%
53.6%
39.1%
10.0%
.9%

6
.9%
1.8%
0%
7.3%
15.5%
47.3%
48.2%
15.5%

7
0%
0%
0%
.9%
0%
7.3%
36.4%
53.6%

8
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
1.8%
27.3%

Note. Table two displays responses by manipulation condition. Input manipulation is
displayed on the vertical column. Responses are listed on the horizontal column. Percentages
denote the percentage of participants who selected each face at recognition. When the input
matches the response, participants chose the correct face. When the input does not match the
response, participants committed a false alarm.
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Appendix A
TEST STIMULI FOR RECALL TASK AND PROTOTYPE IDENTIFICATION
STAGE
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Appendix B
ACQUISTION STIMULI FOR RECALL TASK AND ACQUISITION AND TEST
STIMULI FOR RECOGNITION TEST
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